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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

accomplish and the criteria which must be met before a municipality
may issue its general obligation bonds. Passage of legislation providing for such a procedure would permit a municipality to plan financing projects according to specific standards promulgated by the state
legislature. For example, where development of recreational facilities
is an important aspect of a state's economy, a legislature could declare
that municipal development of such facilities would serve a "public
purpose." Limitations on the type of facilities and on the methods of
financing would provide additional guidance to a municipality which
would also consider the plan in light of the designated standards and
policies. 0 While judicial scrutiny would still be the final step, such a
procedure as suggested would provide a sounder basis for application
of the public purpose doctrine and minimize the prospect of summary
invalidation of municipal financing proposals.
VISITOR RESPONDING TO PUBLIC INVITATION
CLASSIFIED AS INVITEE
Defendant savings and loan association invited local community
groups to use, without charge, a room and adjoining kitchen facilities
on its premises for meetings. Plaintiff was injured on defendant's
premises while walking to a meeting of her organization scheduled for
this room. Plaintiff sued for damages; defendant's motion to dismiss
was granted. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the
order of dismissal and remanded. Held: When the public is invited
to use premises under circumstances implying an assurance of reasonable care, any visitor responding to that invitation is an "invitee"
owed an affirmative duty of reasonable care by the owner or occupier,
whether or not economic benefit may be derived from the visit. McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 68 Wash. Dec. 2d 640,
414 P.2d 773 (1966).
During the nineteenth century the common law evolved the categories of trespasser, licensee, and invitee for persons going on land of
another.' In Washington a land owner or occupier owes an invitee an
'A similar recommendation was made by a commentator on the limitations on
municipal indebtedness in Utah. Elimination of all restrictions on municipal
indebtedness present in the state constitution was advocated, followed by creation by
the legislature of a State Department of Local Government. This department would

have broad powers over financing plans of municipal corporations. See Note,
ConstitutionalRestrictions Upon Municipal Indebtedness, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 462, 487.
'See Comment, 10

995-96 (1964).

ALA.

L. REv. 369, 371-76 (1958); Annot, 95 A.L.R2d 992,
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affirmative duty of reasonable care under the circumstances, 2 whereas
he owes a trespasser or licensee a duty only to refrain from wilful or
wanton injury.3 Two tests have been used to determine whether a
visitor is an invitee or licensee: the "economic benefit test" which
emphasizes the subjective purpose of the visit; and the "invitation
test" which emphasizes the nature of the invitation.4 Washington
early adopted the economic benefit test' and has continued to use it
exclusively.6 The Restatement (Second), Torts suggests use of both
tests.7 The principal case is the first Washington decision' specifically
to adopt the invitation test of the Restatement (Second), Torts, and
'Hartman v. Port of Seattle, 63 Wn. 2d 879, 389 P.2d 669 (1964); DeHeer v.
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn. 2d 122, 372 P.2d 193 (1962).
'Martin v. Hauser, 299 F2d 338, 339 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Washington
law).
The respective duties owed to trespassers and licensees are distinguishable by
certain exceptions wherein a licensee is owed a duty of reasonable care. See
Potts v. Amis, 62 Wn. 2d 777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963) (licensee owed reasonable care
with respect to dangerous activities, as distinguished from conditions, on the
premises); Ward v. Thompson, 57 Wn. 2d 655, 359 P.2d 143 (1961), 37 WASH. L.
Rxv. 250 (1962) (licensee owed reasonable care with respect to dangerous instrumentalities on the premises). See also Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co.,
16 Wn. 2d 424, 432, 133 P.2d 797, 800 (1943); Comment, 39 WASH. L. r\Ev. 345,
346-50 (1964).
A majority of jurisdictions differentiate these respective duties by requiring
that an occupant warn a licensee of unreasonable risks of which the occupant has
knowledge. See PROSSER, TORTS 389-91 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRossER] ;
Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72, 80 (1942). However, in Washington
there is apparently no duty to warn a licensee. See Porter v. Ferguson, 53 Wn.
2d 693, 336 P.2d 133 (1959) ; Dotson v. Haddock, 46 Wn. 2d 52, 58-61, 278 P.2d 338,
341-43 (1955).
' See 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 1478-80 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER &
JAMES] ; PROSSER 395-401.
' Gasch v. Rounds, 93 Wash. 317, 160 Pac. 962 (1916). Introduction of the
economic benefit test into the United States is generally attributed to Plummer v.
Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 31 N.E. 128 (1892), although that case may have been misinterpreted. See Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REv. 573,
604 (1942).
'See, e.g., Dotson v. Haddock, 46 Wn. 2d 52, 278 P.2d 338 (1955); Shock v.
Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn. 2d 599, 105 P.2d
838 (1940) ; Garner v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 3 Wn. 2d 143, 100 P.2d 32 (1940).
§ 332 (1965) :
Invitee Defined
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as
a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the
public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the
possessor of the land.
The "public invitee" category is an addition to the "business visitor" category
contained in RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 332 (1934).
'Two early Washington decisions appeared to apply the invitation test. See
Hanson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 58 Wash. 6, 107 Pac. 863 (1910);
Collins v. Hazel Lumber Co., 54 Wash. 524, 103 Pac. 798 (1909). These cases were
subsequently explained as examples of an exception to the economic benefit test
which provides that one who extends or maintains what appears to be a public
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place an affirmative duty of care upon an occupier when no elements of
economic benefit were present in the visit.
The court in the principal case recognized the recurring judicial
practice of using "rhetorical gymnastics" to find sufficient pecuniary
benefit in the facts of a case to fulfill the economic benefit test. It
sought to avoid this practice, and still reach a "just" result, by emphasizing the nature of the invitation rather than the subjective purpose of
the visit. Following the suggestion of Restatement (Second), Torts1 °
and commentators," the court redefined the invitee category to include
persons responding to a public invitation, but limited this extension by
requiring that the invitation assure that reasonable care had been taken
to prepare for the visitor. Thus, in adopting the invitation test, Washington added an alternative to the economic benefit test as a means of
classifying a visitor as an invitee.
To qualify as an invitee under the economic benefit test, the purpose
for which a visitor enters another's premises must be of actual or
potential pecuniary benefit to the occupier."2 There must be some real
or supposed mutuality of interest between the parties. 13 Prior to the
principal case, visitors on another's premises by permission or invitation who did not present the possibility of economic benefit were
classified as licensees.' 4 Because an occupier owes a licensee a duty
only to refrain from wilful or wanton injury, 15 classification of a plaintiff visitor as a licensee was often tantamount to denying recovery.'"
In an effort to ameliorate this result, courts have developed exceptions
to the economic benefit test

7

or strained facts to come within it.' 8

roadway owes a duty of reasonable care to those who use it. See Dotson v. Haddock,

46 Wn. 2d 52, 56, 278 P.2d 338, 340 (1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 367 (1934).
' The invitation test was adverted to in Ward v. Thompson, 57 Wn. 2d 655, 359
P.2d 143 (1961), 37 WASH. L. Rrv. 250 (1962); however, as there were elements
of pecuniary benefit present, the invitation test was not necessary to the decision.
See McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 68 Wash. Dec. 2d 640, 414
P.2d 773, 777 (1966).

See RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND), TORTS § 332 (1965).
See 2 HARPER & JAMES 1478-80; PROSSER 394-401.
Dotson v. Haddock, 46 Wn. 2d 52, 55, 278 P.2d 338, 340 (1955).
Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 16 Wn. 2d 424, 432, 133 P.2d 797,
801 (1943).
" See Shock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Baily Combined Shows, 5 Wr
2d 599, 605, 105 P.2d 838, 841 (1940).
IrDeffland v. Spokane Portland Cement Co., 26 Wn. 2d 891, 903, 176 P.2d 311,
318 0(1947).
See 37 WASH. L. Rnv. 250, 252 (1962).
,'The guest of a tenant in an office building, apartment, or hotel is an invitee
vis-a-vis the owner. E.g., Holm v. Investment & Sec. Co., 195 Wash. 52, 79 P.2d.
708 (1938). One accompanying an invitee to a store is himself an invitee regardless
of his motivation. See PROSSER 397. But cf. Gasch v. Rounds, 93 Wash. 317, 160
Pac. 962 (1916). A traveller on what reasonably appears to be a public road is an
invitee even though the road is privately maintained on private property. See note
'o
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Such treatment reveals a basic inadequacy in the economic benefit test.
When used alone, the test not only fails to explain many decisions
reached under it, but it affords no satisfactory basis for prediction."
A general goal of the law of landowner liability should be to conform
the duties imposed upon an occupier to a visitor's reasonable expectations.20 If this goal is met, and the occupier adheres to his duty, the
visitor should not be misled by expecting preparations for his safety
which have not been taken. In many situations, however, the duty of
care imposed upon an occupier by the economic benefit test will not
conform to the visitor's expectations. A person entering an office
building to use a public mailbox, or entering a bank to obtain a form,
expects that reasonable safety precautions have been taken; yet he
would be a licensee under the economic benefit test, exempting the
occupier from a duty of reasonable care.21 Application of the economic
benefit test to a customer, however, results in conformity between the
duties imposed upon an occupier and a visitor's expectations.22 The
customer expects and is entitled to reasonable preparation of the
premises for his presence. This conformity, however, is coincidental.
The customer's expectation of reasonable care arises from the nature
of the invitation extended him rather than from an understanding of
the economic benefit test, which imposes affirmative obligations only
in return for some consideration.2 3
The economic benefit test also bears little relation to an occupier's
perception of foreseeable injury. Because he normally will be aware of
'both invitees and licensees, injury to either is equally foreseeable.
A variation in his duty accurately reflects variation in foreseeable injury only if a licensee may be expected to exercise greater care for
8 supra. A duty of reasonable care may be owed to children, generally, regardless of
whether they would be traditionally classified as trespassers, licensees, or invitees.
See Sherman v. City of Seattle, 57 Wn. 2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960).
See, e.g., Kalinowski v. YWCA, 17 Wn. 2d 380, 135 P.2d 852 (1943) (volunteer
worker supervising dance held invitee vis-i-vis YWCA); Heckman v. Sisters of
Charity, 5 Wn. 2d 699, 106 P.2d 593 (1940) (nonpaying guest at graduation ceremony
of a charitable nursing school held an invitee).
" See James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees
and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 616-19 (1954).
1 See Harper, in Laube v. Stevenson: A Discussion, 25 CONN. B.J. 123, at 133-34
(1951); Honre, in Laube v. Stevenson: A Discussion, 25 CoNr. B.J. 123, at 134
(1951).
"See Brosnan v. Koufman, 294 Mass. 495, 2 N.E.2d 441 (1936); Cobb v. First
Nat'l Bank, 58 Ga. App. 160, 198 S.E. 111 (1938). In Washington, economic benefit
does not arise solely from good will. See Barrett v. Faltico, 117 F. Supp. 95, 99
(E.D. Wash. 1953).
'A purchaser or potential purchaser in a store is an invitee under the economic
benefit test. Barnes v. J. C. Penney Co., 190 Wash. 633, 70 Pl2d 311 (1937).
12 HARPER & JAMES 1478. See Bohlen, The Basis of Afflrmative Obligations
in the Law of Tort, 53 U. PA. L. REv. 209 (1905).
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his own safety. However, because classification as a licensee under
the economic benefit test may not conform to expectations of the
visitor, it is possible that he will not exercise this greater care.
The invitation test adopted in the principal case bases liability
upon a representation to a visitor that reasonable care has been exercised in preparing the premises for those invited.24 There are two
elements in the test: first, the visitor must be invited; and second,
there must be some representation to that visitor that reasonable care
has been taken for his safety. An invitation may be either express
or implied, but must be more than passive permission to use the
premises.2 5 A representation of safety is usually implied-either from
a public invitation, or from improvements made on the premises.26
If either requirement is not met, and a visitor cannot qualify under
the economic benefit test, he will be a licensee.
In jurisdictions where it has been adopted, the invitation test has
received limited application. A social guest is still considered a licensee 7 under the rationale that, even though invited, he impliedly agrees
to accept the premises as found, rather than rely upon an assurance
that reasonable care has been taken for his safety.28 Furthermore,
application of the invitation test is limited in the Restatement
(Second), Torts20 and the majority of cases3" to visitors responding to
"public" invitations.
There appears to be no reason why the invitation test could not be
applied where the invitation is limited to an individual. The test is not
based upon the social or business purpose of a visit, but upon the
nature of an invitation and whether it carries an assurance of safety.
"See PRossra 398;

7 suepra.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),

TORTS § 332 (1965), quoted in note

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 332, comment b (1965).
"When a landowner tacitly permits the boys of the town to play ball on his
vacant lot they are licensees only; but if he installs playground equipment and posts
a sign saying that the lot is open free to all children, there is then a public invitation, and those who enter in response to it are invitees." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
TORTS § 332, comment d (1965). Cf. Geigel v. New York City Housing Authority,
225 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (Sup. Ct.) afftd, 17 App. Div. 2d 838, 233 N.Y.S.2d 257
(1962).
12 HArPER & JAMES 1479-80.
For Washington social guest cases under the economic benefit rule see, e.g.,
Lucas v. Barner, 56 Wn.2d 136, 351 P.2d 492 (1960); Porter v. Ferguson, 53 Wn.
2d 693, 336 P.2d 133 (1959) ; McNamara v. Hall, 38 Wn. 2d 864, 233 P2d 852 (1951).
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 330, comment h (1965).
There has been considerable discussion whether this rationale actually reflects the
expectations of the parties. See Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MiNN.
L. Rnv. 573, 603-04 (1942); James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties
Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 611-12 (1954). See generally
Laube v. Stevenson: A Discussion, 25 CONN. B.J. 123 (1951).
§ 332 (1965).
See 2 HARPR & JAMES 1480.
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In many instances this assurance is implicit in the personal relationship between an occupier and visitor, whether or not the visitor is a
member of an invited public. 31 The Washington court apparently
recognized this in Ward v. Thompson.32 Plaintiff in that case was
invited by defendant to visit defendant's home construction site. While
at the site, defendant asked plaintiff to ascend a scaffold with him and
assist in construction, assuring him that the scaffold was safe. The
scaffold collapsed, injuring plaintiff. The court noted that plaintiff
would be an invitee under either the economic benefit or invitation
test. In suggesting the use of the invitation test in this context, the
court necessarily implied that an individual visitor could qualify as an
invitee when assured of the occupier's due care even in the absence of
a public invitation. Use of the invitation test should not be precluded
by the absence of public invitation; rather the court should determine
in each case whether an assurance of due care was made.
The trend in American tort law is toward a general negligence
principle in all fields, 33 requiring that one exercise reasonable care to
forestall foreseeable injury to another.3 4 Expansion of the general
negligence principle has created conflicts with traditional duty limitations on owners and occupiers of land." This is reflected in decisions
requiring that reasonable care be exercised toward licensees in an
increasing number of circumstances, 36 and refusing to extend the traditional categories to new situations.3 Limited landowner liability
originated in feudal times and stems from ancient theories of landowner sovereignty.3 8 Today urban property is divided into small,
"See generally, Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 'MINN. L. Rx.Ev. 573,
602-11 (1942).
257
Wn. 2d 655, 359 P.2d 143 (1961), 37 WASH. L. REv. 250 (1962).
See James, Inroads on Old Tort Conwepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226, 228-31 (1954).
A classic statement of the general negligence principle is found in Heaven v.
Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (C.A. 1883) :
[W]henever one person is placed by circumstances in such a position with regard
to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once
recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or
property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
danger.
See Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313,
317 (1956).
'A licensee is owed a duty of reasonable care with respect to dangerous
activities of the occupier, and dangerous instrumentalities on the premises. See note
3 supra. See also exceptions listed in note 17 supra.
'See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959)
(Supreme Court refused to apply traditional categories in admiralty law); Mills
v. Orcas Power & Light Co., 56 Wn. 2d 807, 355 P.2d 781 (1960) (refusal to apply
traditional categories of trespasser, licensee, and invitee to low flying aircraft).
" See James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226 (1954) ; Note,
37 WASH. L. Rxv. 250, 251 (1962).
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easily policed lots. An urban property owner may expect numerous
and varied visitors. Furthermore, the advent of insurance allows
spreading of liability risks over a large portion of society.39 These
facts raise compelling reasons why limitations on landowner liability,
designed to solve problems of a social system long disappeared, should
be abandoned in favor of a comprehensive general negligence rule.4"
The invitation test is not consistent with general negligence theories
because it limits occupier liability until the limitations are affirmatively
relinquished by an occupier's assurance of reasonable care.4 In contrast, a general negligence rule would create an immediate duty to prevent foreseeable risks. Without an assurance of reasonable care, many
visitors would be classified as licensees under the invitation test when
they would otherwise be owed a duty of reasonable care under general
negligence principles.
The invitation test, however, does reflect general negligence principles more than the economic benefit test, because it expands the
See Comment, 7 W. & If. L. REv. 313, 319 (1966) ; cf. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE
42 (1951); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact
of Liability Insurance,57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
For a discussion of the impact of liability insurance on the social guest rule, see
James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees,
63 YALE L.J. 605, 611-12 (1954).
"Cf. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31
(1959).
There may be some reluctance to apply the general negligence rule to a trespasser,
perhaps because he is a wrongdoer. See Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v.
Landowner: Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MICH. L. REV. 495, 502-03 (1923).
Courts, however, have shown a willingness to require higher duties of care to
habitual trespassers whose presence is foreseeable. See, e.g., Bohlen, The Duty of a
Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA.
L. REv. 237, 250-51 (1921). An occupier would not owe an affirmative duty of care to
WITHOUT FAULT

an unforeseen trespasser under general negligence principles.
New Jersey apparently abondoned the traditional categories and adopted the
general negligence test in Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454,

126 A.2d 313 (1956), and Simmel v. New Jersey Co-op. Co., 47 N.J. Super. 509,
136 A.2d 301, rev'd on, other grounds, 28 N.J. 1, 143 A.2d 521 (1957) ; however, the
court retreated from this position in Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 153
A.2d 1, 5 (1959) :
We believe that adherence to the traditional classifications is desirable in that
it lends a reasonable degree of predictability to this area of the law. These
classifications also aid in the proper distribution of trial functions between
judge and jury, wherein the latter determines only disputed questions of fact.
It has been argued that this refusal to abandon limited duty concepts represents
judicial reluctance to surrender control of the decision-making process to the jury.
See Green, in Laube v. Stevenson: A Discussion, 25 CONN. B.J. 123, at 138 (1951).
d""The duty of a possessor to adult persons who enter the land is wholly selfimposed." Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. REv. 72, 80 (1942).
The basis of liability under the invitation test is similar to the tort doctrine
that one undertaking a gratuitous service must use reasonable care in completing
that service. Compare Allen v. Yazoo & Miss. V.R.R., 111 Miss. 267, 71 So. 386
(1916) (construction of steps over railroad crossing held implied public invitation),
with Erie R.R. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930) (railroad's voluntary
employment of watchman at crossing created duty of due care to those relying on
this practice).
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class of visitors to whom reasonable care is owed.42 Furthermore, the
test more adequately reflects foreseeability, a vital element of a general
negligence rule. Occupier foreseeability of risk is partially dependent
upon visitors' reasonable expectations, because these expectations influence the likelihood of a visitor's presence and care taken for his own
safety. The invitation test accurately reflects such visitor's reasonable
expectations by correlating the occupier's duty to the nature of the
invitation.4 3 Use of the invitation test as an alternative method of
determining an occupier's duty will result in closer relation of the law
of landowner liability to general negligence principles, and should
prevent many of the strained and unpredictable results under exclusive use of the economic benefit test. The conformity with general
negligence principles, however, is still incomplete, representing an
44
appropriate area for further judicial reform.

DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING AND
INCONSISTENT GUARANTEES
Respondent, a national retailer of general merchandise, inserted in
guarantee certificates accompanying some of its products conditions
and limitations not disclosed in guarantees contained in newspaper advertisements. The Federal Trade Commission charged respondent with
a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for
making false and misleading representations.1 Respondent asserted
that whenever a customer made a claim guarantees were honored as
advertised without regard to conditions and limitations contained in
the certificates. On appeal to the Commission, the hearing examiner's
initial decision dismissing the complaint was reversed, and a final order
" The reasonable care owed to an invitee in Washington, however, is not the same
as that owed under general negligence principles; there is no duty to protect a
Washington invitee from open and obvious dangers. Caron v. Grays Harbor County,
18 Wn. 2d 397, 139 P.2d 626 (1943). The Washington rule should be changed to
require a duty of protection if an occupier foresees that a visitor will fail to
protect himself from the danger. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 343, 343A

(1965).

'See
James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees
and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 620-21 (1954).
" See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort
Law, 48 MiNN. L REv. 265, 309-10 (1963).

'Federal

Trade Commission Act, §5(A)(1), 52 Stat ,lll

(1938),

15 U.S.C.

§ 45(a) (1964), amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914), provides: "Unfair methods of com-

petition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
declared unlawful."
The Commission also charged respondent with engaging in unfair methods of
competition in violation of § 5.

